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Abstract: The concern for and the debate on “objectivity” in the scientific
study of religions led scholars to advocate two major approaches known as
“History of Religion” and “Phenomenology of Religion.” Both approaches
are claimed to be “descriptive” and “value-free” as they  stringently enforce
the principle of epochê or distanciation to ensure objectivity.  However, there
are scholars who argue that objectivity (be it “descriptive” or “value-free”) is
ontologically questionable and epistemologically impossible. It is a self-
defeating concept and a myth. They argue that objectivity is principally and
directly concerned with “the object” under investigation regardless of the
types of approach used.
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Religionswissenschaft (Science of Religion or Comparative Study
of Religion) is a new scientific field that is barely a century old. The
origin of this field is attributed to Friedrich Max Müller (1823-1900)
especially to two of his publications: Chips from German Workshop
(1867) and Introduction to the Study of Religion (1873). The scientific
method in the study of the world’s religions, according to him, should
be similar to the one applied in the field of Comparative Philology1
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of which he was one of the leading experts. Because of his emphasis
on “objective” and “scientific” method and also because of his
provocative statement that “He who knows one knows none,”2 Max
Müller has been crowned as “the father of Comparative Study of
Religion.” Using the “objectivity” criteria, scholars rejected the works
on religions carried out before the modern era, the bulk of which
were contributed by Muslim scholars, as inappropriate in any listing
of categories in the field of Religionswissenschaft. These studies
were not objective and hence not scientific or at least their
“scientificity” is debatable. This seems to be one of the reasons for
Western researchers to look down upon classical Muslim
scholarship.
Western Scholars and Muslim Scholarship
Western scholars dealing with the writings of Muslim classics are of
many types. Seymour Cain, for instance, omits Muslims altogether
in his study of religion. He traces the history of the study of religion
from the ancient Greeks through the Roman thinkers to the Western
trends of thinking in modern times, to precisely the second half of
19th century, to the so-called pioneering era of Friedrich Max Müller.
He clearly states that it was only towards the end of the 19th century
that the discipline of the Scientific Study of Religions, in its truly
technical sense, was born.3 He implies that in this development the
Christian and Islamic civilisation has produced no contribution worth
noting in this discipline. Clearly, there is a serious gap and a
significant “missing link” in the chronological development and the
unfolding of the discipline as sketched by Cain.4 However, there
are some Western scholars like Mircea Eliade and Eric J. Sharpe
who in their studies made a mention of some classical works by
Muslim scholars but conclude that the discipline of Comparative
Religion did in fact come into being at the end of the 19th century of
CE, thanks to the serious works by a philologist Friedrich Max
Müller.5
There are some Western scholars or Orientalists who study, edit
and translate the major works of classical Muslims scholars into
European languages. For instance, Edward Sachau, a German scholar,
has translated Al-ÓthÉr al-BÉqiyah Ñan al-QurËn al-KhÉliyah and
TaÍqÊq MÉ li al-Hind min MaqËlah MaqbËlah fÊ al-ÑAql aw
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MardhËlah of AbË al-RayÍÉn Al-BÊrËnÊ (d. 442AH./1050CE.).6
David Thomas edited and translated into English a work of AbË ÔsÉ
al-WarrÉq (d. circa 247AH./862CE.);7 Daniel Gimaret, Guy Monnot,
and Jean Jolivet translated into French Al-Milal wa al-NiÍal of al-
ShahrastÉnÊ (d. 548AH./1153CE.);8 and Thomas F. Michel, S.J.
translated into English a work of Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728AH./
1328CE.) entitled Al-JawÉb al-ØaÍÊÍ li-Man Baddala DÊn al-MasÊÍ.9
Finally, there are Western scholars or Orientalists who study the
works of classical Muslim scholars in this field. The most well-known
among this group is Jacques Waardenburg, a Professor of
Comparative Study of Religion at Utrecht University, who was
concerned with the issue of “objectivity-subjectivity” in the
discipline.10 This is reflected in his Classical Approaches to the Study
of Religion (2 vols.), and Reflections on the Study of Religion.11
Apparently, Waardenburg’s main concern is to “criticise” the works
of Muslim scholars, the classical as well as the contemporary, in the
light of the dominant Western concepts and methodologies. To
Waardenburg, the classical Muslim scholars have failed to
understand and represent other religions objectively. What the
Muslims saw, according to him, were “images” (subjective
understandings) “developed within their own cultural and religious
orbit.”12 To him, this is the main problem that has prevented the
emergence of the discipline of “objective” and “scientific” study of
religions in the Muslim world. This is all the more difficult, according
to Waardenburg, because of the adage that “Islam is the final and
true religion.”13
Objectivity According to the West
The Western conception of objectivity is that the researcher’s “belief”
or “religion” should not intervene in the process of studying other
religions. Failure to observe this golden rule, the output of the
research and study will inevitably be biased and subjective or simply
not objective. According to the experts of Religionswissenschaft,
one has to absolutely maintain distanciation between him/herself
(as the “subject”) and the religion under study (as the “object”),
observing vividly and scrupulously the two phenomenological
principles: (i) epochê (from the Greek word: epechô, meaning “I
hold back,” which means also: stoppage, disengagement or
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bracketing); and (ii) eidatic vision (the ability to observe without
“prior beliefs and interpretations” influencing understanding and
perception). A researcher or practitioner of Religionswissenschaft is
not allowed strictly to pass any judgment, either for or against, the
religion under study.14
Western conception of objectivity is well summarised by Wilfred
Cantwell Smith saying that “No statement about a religion is valid
unless it can be acknowledged by that religion’s believers.” Referring
to his own study, Smith is of the opinion: “Anything that I say about
Islam as a living faith is valid only as far as Muslims can say ‘amen’
to it.”15 It is not realized that this principle, although seemingly
promising, is flawed when faced with reality. William Roff, for
instance, questions Smith by saying: “How many–or how few–
Muslims may in such circumstances constitute a court?”16 Al-FÉrËqÊ
has a similar question: “The consent of which adherents of the faith
may be taken as proof, and how many such consent be expressed?”
He goes further and says:
Moreover, it must be at least theoretically possible that the
adherents of a religion may have gone so far in interpreting
their religion that they have missed its primeval essence,
that they do not find it any longer meaningful. This is of
course tantamount to their acquiring a new religion, despite
the fact that the new may still be called by the name of the
old; and Smith’s criterion cannot therefore be taken as a test
of validity in the strict sense.17
Yet, the West insists that “objectivity” (Arabic: al-mawÌËÑiyyah) in
research cannot be compromised, especially in the field of
Religionswissenschaft whose very object of study is religion
(something that, according to Søren Kierkegaard, towards which
neutrality is not possible).18 In the scientific or scholarly tradition,
there is absolutely no room for subjectivity (Arabic: al-dhÉtiyyah)
and prejudice (prae + judicium: a judgment that has been passed
before the issue has been subject to test or trial).
However, this issue of objectivity in reality has left a question
mark at the level of theory or epistemology and of practice. In
particular, it is necessary to examine their insistence on “value-free-
ness” as the determining principle of objectivity. The majority of
practitioners of the field, especially the pioneers, almost unanimously
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agree that the spirit of “value-free-ness” must be pervasive in every
step of the process of research. Value-judgment is “unlawful” and,
thus, must be avoided.
The ontological and epistemological question is whether there is
something called “value-free” on earth? It is easier to talk about
“value-freeness” but difficult, if not impossible, to explain or verify
its existence. This is simply a “slogan” which has developed into a
“dogma” for the practitioners and students of Religionswissenschaft.
When looked at realistically, human beings (whoever, wherever and
whenever he/she is) cannot live without “a set of values” believed
to be the ultimate “truth.” And the source and supplier of value is
religion, or “substitute of religion” (whatsoever its form and
manifestation), or what is identified by the scholars as “quasi-
religion,” “worldview,” “semi-religion,” “weltanschauung” or what
could be simply called “new religion.”19 In fact, the very insistence
on “value-free-ness” is a “value” which is, in the belief of its
adherence, the ultimate “truth.” Without being consciously thought
by the claimant, such an understanding has actually defeated the
claim of objectivity (“value-free-ness”). Senay dubs this principle a
“myth” which
distorts the study of religion’s aim to understand its subject,
by implicitly taking up an agnostic stance in relation to
nature of knowledge or reality. The apparent objectivity or
neutrality of the phenomenological approach is, on closer
scrutiny, a judgment against religious worldviews.20
Thus, the attempts made by the practitioners of the discipline to
avoid value-judgment is of no avail, “for the contexts themselves
contain presuppositions that are not value-free.”21
It has been argued by many that scientists, despite themselves,
cannot avoid being ethically and morally responsible for the
formulation, direction, methodologies, and consequences of their
work. Earlier, Paul Tillich, a well-known Christian theologian and
philosopher, has stated that a researcher or an observer is a human
being who, like all other human beings, thinks and acts in accordance
with the configuration and framework of value or a set of values in
which he/she believes. If it is not based on religions proper, it is
nevertheless based on the substitutes of religion (quasi-religions).
To him:
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The outside observer is always an inside participant with a
part of his being, for he also has confessed or concealed
answers to the questions which underlie every form of religion.
If does not profess a religion proper, he nevertheless belongs
to a quasi-religion, and as consequence he also selects, judges,
and evaluates.22
What is being emphasised here is that full-fledged descriptive studies
in social sciences and humanities, as required in both
Phenomenology and History of Religion, are humanly impossible.
To identify Phenomenology of Religion (which necessitates the two
principles of epochê and eidatic vision) with the so-called “Scientific
Study of Religion” is untenable and baseless. Wiebe concludes that
“the scientific study of religion must go beyond mere description to
explanation. And to explain a thing requires a knowledge of its true
character–it involves the ‘truth question.’”23 Isma’il al-Faruqi opined
that the phenomenological descriptive approach is necessary in order
for the study of religion to be objective, but it alone is insufficient.
In the study of religions, al-Faruqi points out, judgment or
evaluation is not only necessary, but as a matter of fact also desirable
and possible.24 However, this judgment has to be based upon valid
principles and methodologies verifiable logically and rationally. In
this regards, Al-Faruqi introduced a methodology called meta-religion
which guarantees “objectivity” of a study.25 Ontologically and
epistemologically, the “truth question” constitutes an organic part
of Religionswissenschaft and is inseparable from it. Therefore,
passing of judgment directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly,
has been taking place in most, if not all, of the works of the
practitioners of the field. The difference is only in the matter of
intensity and degree. It is this intensity in Muslim scholarship which
Seymour Cain, Mircea Eliade and Jacques Waardenburg disdain.
As stated above, Cain did not acknowledge the intellectual
contribution of the classical Muslim scholars. Mircea Eliade and
Jacques Waardenburg gave it a partial coverage but tried
systematically, and pejoratively, to prove Muslim scholarship as of
no value.
It is worth noting, however, that the Orientalists did indulge in
passing judgments, for instance, by naming Indian traditions as
Hinduism and Buddhism. These terms were not known to the ancient
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world. These terms are not found in Indian religious scriptures nor
in al-BÊrËnÊ’s well-known, TaÍqÊq MÉ li al-Hind, an “anthropological
study” of India based upon rigorous field research.26 Al-BÊrËnÊ,
instead, uses prevalent terms like  al-BarÉhimah (Brahmanism), al-
Barahman (the Brahmin), and al-Shumaniyyah (for the followers
of Buddha).27 These and other terms, as Cantwell Smith concurs,
were introduced by the outsiders (most probably, the Orientalists
and colonialists) in the modern era.28
Conclusion
Objectivity, as defined by Western scholars, is to be “value-free”
and “descriptive.” In this sense, objectivity is impossible in the study
of religion. “Objectivity” (al-mawÌËÑiyyah) has something to do
with the “object” (al-mawÌËÑ) directly and how to deal with it. In
dealing with the “object,” it is possible to evaluate it following clearly
laid down methodology. In the Qur’Én, this “objectivity” is
associated with al-Ñadl (justice), a principle that must be enforced in
all situations.
The Qur’Én is categorical: “Be just: that is nearer to piety; and
fear Allah” (SËrat al-MÉ’idah, 5:8). Muslim scholars in the field of
Religionswissenschaft, and in every other fields, made serious
attempts to translate and articulate this sublime Qur’Énic values and
principles into everyday practice. They did this as an act of ÑibÉdah
(sincere worship) to Allah. They knew well that “objectivity” in the
sense of treating the “object” justly (as enjoined by al-Qur’Én) is
humanly possible.29 It is precisely because of this very “translating
and articulating of the Qur’Énic values and principles into practice”
that the works of the Muslim scholars were termed as “subjective,”
“biased” and unscientific by Western scholars. Their judgments on
Muslim scholarship emanate from their superiority complex and from
their religious and intellectual prejudices. As Fazlur Rahman points
out:
... pre-nineteenth century Western treatments of Islam suffered
from ... [religious prejudice], while nineteenth and early
twentieth century scholarship suffered particularly from ...
[cultural and intellectual prejudice].30
A just and positive attitudinal shift in Western scholarship towards
the East, especially Islam, is yet to take place.
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